Originally published in Historia de las Ideas nº 5 in January 2026s nº 5 en enero de 2026
RESUME
Lenin was the most influential figure of his time, with a historical impact that extends to the present day and whose legacy continues to shape political, ideological, and historiographical debates. His trajectory and thought, marked by both achievements and shortcomings, require an approach that avoids both uncritical idealization and ideological prejudice, developing an analysis of his fundamental contributions alongside the errors and limits of some of his positions. The breadth of his political action and theoretical work places him as a central actor in the shaping of the twentieth century, evident in his leading role in the Russian Revolution and in the international projection of the political and ideological models articulated under his leadership. The study of his figure therefore demands a rigorous and objective approach, attentive to the material conditions under which he formulated his positions and developed his political practice, and distant from dogmatic or emotional readings. Only through a critical historical examination is it possible to understand the true scope of his legacy and the extent of his influence on history.
INTRODUCTION
This work is merely a brief introduction to the theoretical and practical contributions of Lenin, the communist leader and central figure of the Russian Revolution, both for his theorizing on the communist party model, the art of insurrection, and his guidance on the stages of revolution, as well as for his own role as leader of the Bolsheviks.
The Russian Revolution was the most important event of the 20th century, not so much for the political change in Russia itself, but for the political, economic, and military implications that would shape the rest of the century. [1].
This article is a study of Lenin's role in history, which has been distorted due to the prevailing anti-communist paradigm in historiography. [2]The struggle between fascism and communism, and the subsequent Cold War, still prevent an objective study that sets aside passions and anti-communist sentiment.
Furthermore, the term "communism," like "fascism," has undergone a process of opportunistic and senseless political manipulation, leading to the distortion of both terms and a real lack of definition for most of society. For some, their adversaries, simply by virtue of being adversaries, are labeled communists or fascists, depending on the individual's reactionary woke stance. These terms have become empty shells, yet they continue to generate considerable rejection, even though the reasons for their initial resentment have faded over time.
We live in a polarized political climate, where attempts are made to portray us as being on the brink of civil war, in a struggle between communists and fascists, but in reality, neither exists. Or if they do, it's in such a marginal way that they don't deserve to be taken into account.
In this context, I felt it necessary to write this article, highlighting the statesman, the ideologue, the leader, setting aside prejudices and biases. Even Steve Bannon, hardly a communist, recognizes the value and, in his opinion, the significant contributions of the Russian leader. [3].
In this article, I will primarily address the author's positions, theories, and contributions to the revolutionary movement, focusing on what I consider his most successful actions. However, I will also point out what I consider his most erroneous actions, which had disastrous consequences for the revolutionary movement he once led.
Of course, all of this is far removed from dogmatic messianism and historical revisionism, which have done so much damage to the communist movement and to the very image of the historical figure. Lenin was not a god, nor someone who dictated absolute truths, and his contributions cannot be understood as something quasi-biblical. He made mistakes like any human being, and understanding Marxism as something dogmatic, not creative, is precisely the opposite of what he defended.
Lenin was a great statesman, a revolutionary leader, and someone who shaped history, just as Stalin did. Only time will allow us to study his life and work without the biases and, above all, the prejudices born of the proximity of his era. Just as we can study Bismarck, Machiavelli, Napoleon, Julius Caesar, or Hannibal, the day will come when we can objectively assess some Soviet leaders without being labeled a member of the axis of evil or something worse.
This article does not aim to be a detailed study of Lenin's thought, as that would require several volumes of hundreds of pages each, which is diametrically opposed to the objective of this text, which is simply to foster reflection and debate on a highly relevant figure from perspectives that are not the usual ones. Even so, it will highlight what I consider to be the most important issues.
LENIN'S CONTRIBUTIONS
Kalinin, in an address to the Fifth Congress of the Communist International, pointed out that Lenin's three main ideas were the alliance of workers and peasants, the solution of the national problem, and the dictatorship of the proletariat, and that it was necessary not only to preserve these weapons, but to temper and forge them even further. [4].
I couldn't disagree with him more, at least on the second point. Although the national situation in Russia and later in the USSR turned out well for him, his own promotion of these positions to other countries seriously damaged the communist parties and the revolution. Both the national question and his cosmopolitan vision of the early years will be addressed in the next section.
Regarding the first question, the worker-peasant alliance did have a significant impact. Lenin spoke of an honest alliance between workers and working peasants, since in his view socialism would defend the interests of both. [5]This was one of the factors that marked a difference from the 1905 revolution, as the peasantry went from being the reserve army of the bourgeoisie and reaction to allies of the revolution. [6]This thesis on the peasantry was a point of contention with Trotsky, who tried to maintain worker primacy in a rather anti-Marxist way.
Regarding the third point, although it was under his leadership that power was seized, due to the assassination attempt that removed him from power and his premature death, the construction of socialism, or at least its development and deepening, was Stalin's work. Therefore, despite his theorizing, it already existed in the work of other authors beforehand. I believe it cannot be singled out as something central to him, although certainly his vision regarding the seizure of power is, but that is another matter, even though it is related.
Before delving into the process of seizing power, it is necessary to highlight Lenin's crucial role in adapting Marxism to the material conditions of the time. Some might say he reconstituted the ideology, a term only accurate if we refer to significant changes within it resulting from its adaptation to the circumstances of the moment.
Trotsky went so far as to emphasize that Lenin, in his role as leader of the Russian Revolution, elevated the most pressing problems of the revolution to fundamental questions of the ideology itself, of Marxism. [7].
This reconstitution or adaptation of ideology to the material conditions of the time, carried out by Lenin, was continued by Stalin in the process of building the socialist state, the commitment to socialism in one country, revolutionary patriotism, the rejection of cosmopolitanism, and the defense of cultural and national identity. Continuing with the changes of this period, an adaptation is also necessary today, but that is not the subject of this article.
Another important aspect developed by Lenin was the design of a new type of party and how to carry out and focus agitation and propaganda. Both of these issues were developed in Where to Begin? and What Is to Be Done?, although he elaborated on the matter even further in other texts such as Letter to a Comrade.
The party ceased to be a mass party in the social-democratic style and became a vanguard party, composed of cadres trained to be the General Staff of the revolution. [8]The aim was professionalization, to have professional revolutionaries organized within a party capable of combining legal and clandestine struggle.
Conscious discipline, verticality, and democratic centralism were key elements in this new structure, which sought to be the model party in what it itself termed the imperialist phase of capitalism. [9].
This party model was the one the Bolsheviks built to successfully carry out the revolution in Russia, and it worked for them, to the point that parties inspired by theirs were created all over the world. These parties were subjected to Bolshevization campaigns to make them as similar as possible to the Russian one.
When the Communist International was founded, it was established as a single international party composed of national sections, which were those communist parties that had been created in the Bolshevik image after their rise to power. [10].
Of course, from a communist perspective, both this model and, above all, how to carry out agitation and propaganda must be adapted to the present times. The rise of social media and the internet, the development of society, the outright criminalization of communism, and the lack of class consciousness necessitate a change in how we try to reach workers and raise their awareness.
Anyone who believes that in Spain or any other country, having a workers' newspaper or distributing propaganda in factories is still useful after the first quarter of the 21st century is living in a parallel reality. When I see supposedly communist organizations focusing their propaganda efforts on publishing an online newspaper that no one reads, using 19th-century terminology and unrealistic proposals while invoking the Bolsheviks, I can't help but feel pity.
History repeats itself, like a farce, a grotesque caricature of what came before. A movement that fails to address the needs of those it supposedly represents or defends is a dead movement, even if they pretend not to know it. What they should do is adapt and do something worthwhile, like the Bolsheviks, instead of engaging in a terrible charade that only tarnishes their legacy.
Regarding the state, Lenin continued in the footsteps of Marx and Engels, arguing that it is a product of the irreconcilable nature of classes, an instrument of class domination, of the oppression of one class by another, or even others. All states use violence to impose their own order; even in the most democratic state, repression exists, though it is exceptional against groups that attempt to subvert the established order.
For Lenin, there is no other way to liberate the oppressed class than through a violent revolution and the subsequent destruction of the state apparatus that preceded the change. [11]One of the Russian leader's main contributions was precisely his commitment to destroying the old in order to build the new, a principle applicable to far more areas than just the state and the seizure of power.
The mere conquest of the old state structure was insufficient for the transformation of society, clashing head-on with reformist tactics that sought to achieve sweeping changes through reforms of the bourgeois state. [12].
Furthermore, he pointed out, anticipating later analyses of the rise of fascism, that the democratic domination of the bourgeoisie was the best possible guise, since the parties in power could change, but the same ones remained dominant, guaranteeing the survival of capitalism through these apparent changes. [13].
This continues to happen today, a good example being the Spanish party system, which alternates in power but all defends the same class interests.
The state, even the most democratic, would be a dictatorship of capital, since it would defend the interests of the ruling class, imposing them by force on the oppressed. The new proletarian state would also be a dictatorship, for although democratic for the working class, which would become the dominant class, it would be a dictatorship for the bourgeoisie. Therefore, the view that every state is a dictatorship is clear in Lenin's work. [14].
The difference between the two lies in the fact that in the dictatorship of capital there is oppression of the majority by the minority, while in the proletarian state there is oppression of the minority by the majority, with the aim of abolishing the minority. The goal would be the withering away of the state and the end of all oppression, including the end of social classes.
Lenin put into practice what he, Marx, and Engels also called the art of insurrection. [15]The difference between the Russian leader and the fathers of scientific socialism lies in the fact that the former put it into practice victoriously.
The Bolsheviks were accused of being Blanquists, of staging coups, by the Social Democratic leaders and later by the entire bourgeoisie, who adopted their principles out of concern for the expansion of the Soviet model. This accusation is completely unfounded, no matter how widely it has been propagated.
First, the revolution wasn't carried out by the Bolsheviks through a successful putsch; it was carried out by the masses, even though the Bolsheviks acted as the General Staff. Without the majority support of the population, at least of the active forces of society, seizing power would have been impossible.
It wasn't even a typical military coup, since the Bolsheviks lacked the necessary strength in the army and influence among the command. Even if soldiers participated in the Petrograd uprising, without mass support they would have been swept aside quickly.
Furthermore, it's important to remember that the February Revolution, when the uprising took place, wasn't an event involving only the Bolsheviks and the masses; many other groups participated, some of them without coordination with the Bolsheviks. The breadth of the movement easily refutes accusations that the revolution was the work of a small group of conspirators; even if such individuals existed, they were part of something much larger over which they had no control.
Secondly, the insurrectionary process promoted by the Bolsheviks was not initiated by a small group, but by a party with deep ties to broad sectors of the working class. [16].
The Bolsheviks are often portrayed as a gang of ragged outcasts, but this kind of description doesn't fit with their ability to win a majority in the soviets in Petrograd and Moscow. Their capacity and influence are more than proven by the successes they achieved, which were unattainable by a mere small group of conspirators.
Lenin continued Engels' vision of insurrection as an art, emphasizing that it must be carried out to the end, that forces must be concentrated in the right place and not divided, that the offensive must be taken since nothing is gained on the defensive, that it was necessary to surprise the enemy, and that daily victories must be achieved to maintain high morale among the revolutionaries. [17].
All these principles were perfectly executed in the capture of Petrograd, which immediately had repercussions throughout the rest of Russia.
In Letters from Afar, The Tasks of the Proletariat in the Present Revolution, and The Tasks of the Proletariat in Our Revolution, Lenin develops his positions on the war and how to act, on dual power, the commitment to the soviets, and the need to move towards a socialist revolution. His positions were in the minority within the party, and it was not without effort that he managed to get it to adopt his proposals, although some of them, such as Zimmerwald's departure, were not accepted. [18].
In the second thesis of his April Theses, Lenin elaborated on the need to move from the first stage of the revolution, which gave power to the bourgeoisie, to the second, which was to give power to the working class. Although thesis number eight addresses the impossibility of the immediate implementation of socialism, they were at that moment on the cusp of the transition from the democratic to the socialist revolution. [19].
This distinction would not only shape the future of Soviet Russia but would also become a central issue in the development and strategies of communist parties worldwide.
This question had already been addressed prior to the theses in his text The Attitude of Social Democracy Towards the Peasant Question, within the framework of what the author himself termed the uninterrupted revolution. [20]In his work Two Tactics of Social Democracy in the Democratic Revolution, he will also point out the need for the transition from the democratic revolution to the socialist one, [21]but he will also underline, in relation to the above, the difference between a bourgeois or reformist leadership of the revolutionary process, destined to fail, and a consistent revolutionary and workers' leadership that takes the revolutionary process to the end, to total victory. [22].
The entire question of seizing power, insurrection as an art, and the delimitation of the stages of revolution represented not only a practical success but also a significant part of Lenin's legacy to the world revolutionary movement.
His position on the war, including his embrace of revolutionary defeatism, was undeniably successful under the specific material conditions of the historical moment, but it cannot be extrapolated to every situation, since even the Soviets themselves did not maintain it in their support for various countries within the framework of their geopolitical strategy.
Finally, it is necessary to highlight Lenin's constant struggle against all forms of revisionism, attempting to wage a relentless fight against those who, in his view, were trying to eliminate the revolutionary essence of Marxism, rendering it useless for achieving the revolution.
He vehemently combated both leftists and rightists in many of his works; to highlight two, I will mention one from each tendency: The Proletarian Revolution and the Renegade Kautsky and Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder.
LENIN'S MOST SERIUS MISTAKES
I'll probably get a lot of flak for including this subtitle, but I believe it's necessary to offer a critical analysis of Lenin, a historical figure who indelibly shaped my thinking and whom I've been studying continuously since I was sixteen.
I think my knowledge of his life and work is deep enough to allow me to analyze and critique his greatest successes and contributions, as well as his major errors and failures.
You can't study a personality like the Russian leader's, or any other, from a place of emotional hatred or deification, as if he were Jesus Christ returning to Earth. For some, what I'm about to point out will constitute some of the author's arguments for redemption, but considering subsequent historical developments, I can't see it that way.
Regarding revolutionary defeatism, it's important to point out that Lenin didn't support the bourgeoisie of any country; rather, he wanted to exploit the Russian defeat for his own benefit. Even so, positions like the one he held regarding the Russo-Japanese War—rejoicing in the Russian defeat and describing Japanese imperialism as progressive—were a mistake. [23].
It's crucial to remember that the Japanese attacked by surprise, a typical attack by one power against another. Therefore, for Russia, the war was essentially a defensive one, and this was also the view of Russian workers. All they achieved was being seen as traitors to the motherland, making it difficult to reach many workers who did possess patriotic sentiment.
During World War I, faced with the threat of the destruction of the newly formed Soviet regime, Lenin went so far as to assert that if the Germans did not cease their attacks and a peace agreement was not reached, they would develop true revolutionary defensism. [24].
Ultimately, they achieved an unconditional peace that allowed them to survive, albeit at a heavy cost. Lenin's gamble on unconditional peace stemmed from necessity, as the Russian army lacked the capacity at that time to resist or attack the German army. This gamble was successful, but only due to the specific material conditions of that historical moment.
It is not a lesson to be mechanically extrapolated to the conditions of other countries, as doing so only led to failures.
Can anyone imagine a situation in which Morocco militarily attacked Ceuta and Melilla with the intention of annexing them? What would happen if the communists defended the actions or the outcome of an attack by the Islamic dictatorship because, according to them, it weakens those who hold power in Spain? Although, unfortunately, the Spanish elites are in Morocco's pocket. Well, they would be exposed as traitors to the country and Islamophiles, stripping them of any influence over the workers.
The reason I use this seemingly absurd example is because there are groups that do defend what I've outlined. Applying this mechanically, especially while boasting about the Russian example, will only lead to their further repudiation by Spanish society.
Anything other than defending the sovereignty and interests of the workers of the attacked country is playing into the hands of reaction, particularly in the current context of the cosmopolitan or globalist offensive against nations. [25] sobre las naciones.
It's one thing for your country to attack another and for you to oppose the war, and quite another for your country to be attacked and for you to rejoice, thereby contributing to your country's defeat by inaction. In this situation, from a revolutionary perspective, there is no other possible position than defending your country, regardless of the accusations leveled by anarchists, leftists, progressives, and other such national and revolutionary defensive types. It's better to be a defender than a traitor to your homeland and its workers.
Subsequently, beginning with the Seventh Congress of the Communist International, the Popular Front was adopted, which also included the bourgeoisie, albeit referred to as progressive. In the countries where they came to power, they developed a clear revolutionary defense strategy against fascism.
The communists themselves revised their Leninist position in response to the demands of the moment, allying themselves with the bourgeoisie that did not support fascism in order to maintain democracy and bourgeois regimes. [26]What they would have done once fascism was defeated is another matter, but their strategy at the time was an alliance with the progressive bourgeoisie for national defense against both internal and external enemies. In fact, in Spain, they even referred to the Civil War as a national-revolutionary war.
At the beginning of this text, Kalinin's opinion on Lenin's most important aspects was presented. His proposal on the national question is one of the most frequently cited, and in my opinion, one of the most damaging.
Lenin maintained a nihilistic and anti-patriotic view of national identity and a commitment to internationalism aimed at creating global governance and a single international culture. He advocated educating workers in "indifference" to national differences, calling for a fight against narrow-mindedness, isolation, and small-nation particularism. [27].
For those who doubt global governance and the merging of nations, I leave you with this short excerpt from the author, although there are several texts on the same subject:
We are enemies of national hatred, national quarrels, and national isolation. We are internationalists. We aspire to close union and the complete fusion of the workers and peasants of all nations of the world into a single world Soviet Republic. [28].
He divided culture into two: national culture and, within this, proletarian culture. Let us analyze two fragments from the author's work, Critical Notes on the National Problem, on this subject:
"In every national culture, there exist, even if undeveloped, elements of democratic and socialist culture, for in every nation there is a working and exploited mass whose living conditions inevitably give rise to a democratic and socialist ideology. But in every nation there also exists a bourgeois culture (and, moreover, in most cases, an ultra-reactionary and clerical one), not merely as isolated elements, but as the dominant culture. Therefore, "national culture" in general is the culture of the landowners, the clergy, and the bourgeoisie." [29].
"By launching the slogan of "international culture of democracy and the world workers' movement," we take from each national culture only its democratic and socialist elements, and we take them solely and exclusively as a counterweight to the bourgeois culture and bourgeois nationalism of each nation." [30].
It makes no sense, except perhaps to the anti-national cosmopolitan, to claim that the only redeeming features of a national culture are two traits, democratic and socialist, which can be found in any developed nation and do not distinguish one cultural or national reality from another. What makes a culture unique is what is relevant, not international traits that only serve to homogenize groups of people.
I find it absurd to argue that national culture belongs only to landowners and the bourgeoisie. National culture, at least in the case of Spain, has its origins in times before the dominance of the bourgeoisie and the establishment of capitalism.
The view that only the country's elite possess or have access to culture is unfounded in societies like ours, where there is compulsory education, public libraries, access to books and other materials online, and free museum admission days. It is true that those with money have greater opportunities, but to think that culture is only within reach of landowners and the wealthy bourgeoisie is to live in a parallel fantasy world.
Furthermore, popular culture, which has little to do with democracy and socialism, has been passed down from generation to generation over time. Popular literature and many other aspects of culture have existed for a long time. Is Cervantes's Don Quixote something exclusive to the bourgeoisie and therefore to be discarded? Is the Book of Good Love something only accessible to millionaires? Should we discard gastronomy, dances, clothing, books, and a long list of other things simply because they have nothing to do with democracy and socialism? Because all of these things are part of our national culture.
It's important to keep in mind that much of this national culture originates from popular culture, undergoes a process of expansion, and becomes a general part of the culture of society, affecting both rich and poor. Democratic elements are present in national culture in Europe, but that doesn't mean they are a determining factor.
In the USSR, under Stalin's leadership, these positions were rectified, embracing Russian identity, culture, history, and traditions.
This cosmopolitan vision of culture goes hand in hand with indifference to national identity, the influence of the pursuit of the longed-for world revolution, [31] and its commitment to the fusion of all nations into one, dismantling the borders of each country. [32]In his opinion, defending the borders of nationality and homeland is to fall into reactionary, nationalist, and opportunistic positions, as these are temporary and run counter to his vision of the development of human societies. [33].
Lenin's position on immigration, at least theoretically—because in practice he created the border guard with policies that cannot be said to have encouraged immigration [34]—is a precedent for the positions currently held by the postmodern and woke left.
To elaborate on this point, I would like to present some excerpts from his works:
"There is no doubt that only extreme poverty forces people to leave their homeland and that capitalists shamelessly exploit immigrant workers. However, only reactionaries can close their eyes to the progressive significance of this modern migration of peoples." [35].
"A few words on the resolution concerning emigration and immigration. Here too, the committee attempted to defend narrow guild-like conceptions, pushing through the prohibition of immigration of workers from underdeveloped countries (the coolies from China, etc.). This reflects the same aristocratic spirit prevalent among the proletariat of some 'civilized' countries, who derive certain advantages from their privileged position and therefore tend to disregard the demands of international class solidarity." [36].
In our struggle for true internationalism and against 'jingosocialism,' we consistently denounce in our press the opportunist leaders of the Socialist Party (SP) in North America, who advocate restricting the immigration of Chinese and Japanese workers (especially after the Stuttgart Congress of 1907 and despite its resolutions). We believe that one cannot be an internationalist and, at the same time, support such restrictions. [37].
Lenin's position is favorable to modern migration, [38]even celebrating the mixing or assimilation into this nihilistic internationalism. [39]He correctly points out that large capitalists bring immigrants in precarious situations to exploit them, but he sees something progressive in this act. However, reality has shown that not only are those who come exploited, but also that, as a result of this immigration, working-class neighborhoods and working conditions deteriorate. Far from assimilating as Lenin predicted, they regroup and form parallel societies that create even more problems. [40].
Lenin's vision of what would happen with the mixing of workers from different backgrounds has not come to pass; it has proven wrong. There has been neither a fusion, nor has class consciousness been raised, nor has it led to any revolutionary advance. On the contrary, it has fostered a decidedly unprogressive reaction from certain political and social sectors.
These strategies were not implemented in Russia either; in fact, they were accused by various sectors of Russifying the entire Soviet Union, of maintaining impermeable borders, and of patriotism—yes, the very same social-patriotism that Lenin had so vehemently criticized.
Before the entire process of change in the USSR under Stalin, Lenin himself had accused him of being a national socialist because of the Georgian question, for the very same actions he later carried out under Stalin's leadership in the USSR. [41].
For Lenin, restricting or controlling the migration process would promote national narrow-mindedness, leading to aristocratic tendencies or attitudes—a kind of guild mentality—that ran counter to internationalism.
However, a letter from Lenin's later years contains his words about the need to suspend a certain type of immigration, intolerable, amounting to some 200 to 300 immigrants per month, which he argued had to be stopped. He labeled these individuals as speculators, counter-revolutionaries, and other similar types. [42].
Some might say it was due to the nature of the immigration, but isn't that discrimination according to the narratives of the currently hegemonic left? Don't large numbers of foreign, lumpenized, Islamist, and criminal populations arrive in Europe? Reality ultimately prevailed, even in Lenin's final years, just as it would within the revolutionary movement in the future.
With Stalin, the rectification of the nihilistic vision of internationalism was complete, but if by this we understand what Lenin developed (except for the final moments of his life), I cannot define myself as such, since I consider that the correct positions not only in his time, but even moving forward in time to today are those of revolutionary patriotism, the defense of the sovereignty of peoples and their identity, culture and history.
Communism is not a dogma, nor is it tied to a historical figure who possesses absolute truth. Lenin's positions on all these issues were not only erroneous, but his influence, even to this day, has been overwhelmingly negative. His only supporters are cosmopolitans and the defenders of today's degenerate left—that is, those who serve the powerful, those who control the capitalist system.
The doctrinaire use of mutilated and out-of-context quotes is alien to the Marxist method and to any conception that claims to have a scientific basis. They have turned an ideology into a religion. [43].
Finally, this work cannot conclude without addressing the right to self-determination. While Lenin, both in the national question and in this particular endeavor, attempted to prioritize the class question above all others, this approach, which is his solution to the national question, is not applicable to every circumstance.
Lenin did not support the independence of any territory unless it represented an advance for the general revolutionary movement. Furthermore, defending this right did not mean that they supported any separation; for them, the exemplary solution was voluntary union. [44].
However, this right and its potential application have been misinterpreted when it comes to advocating for it in circumstances that do not represent progress for the revolutionary movement, and in some cases, it is invoked for regions that are not even nations, or even nationalities.
Spain is a good example of this, a country where the political separation of any region makes no sense, but where in some regions political activity revolves around this issue due to the interests of the regional bourgeoisie, but certainly not those of the workers.
The right to self-determination is not inherently wrong; the mistake lies in advocating for it in contexts where there is no colonial or national oppression. In Spain, defending it would be erroneous and counterproductive, but in Western Sahara, it seems to me to be the right solution. The problem is mechanically extrapolating and adopting positions simply because they are part of the prevailing ideological package.
A concrete analysis of the specific situation—that is the way forward.
CONCLUSION
Throughout this work, the main issues concerning Lenin's political positions and strategies have been addressed, dividing them into two groups: those I consider correct and those I do not. Each of these has been developed, highlighting their political implications and consequences. This lays the groundwork for initiating a debate about the Russian leader, aiming to contextualize and highlight the historical figure beyond personal biases.
The intention of this study was none other than to present the historical figure from a dispassionate, critical, and useful perspective, in order to dispel prejudices and ignorance about Lenin's true role not only in the Russian revolutionary process but also in the development of the world and human society during the 20th century. This objective has been developed and demonstrated throughout the study, and is considered fulfilled, although it opens the door to a more extensive work in the future.
The impact of the Russian statesman is greater than that of many well-regarded historical figures, studied from school onwards without criminalization and popularized in books, series, or films. Undoubtedly, the passage of time will allow for a reassessment free from criminalization, and this study only aims to contribute a small part to such an arduous task.
Lenin was a great strategist, an unparalleled leader in the Russian Revolution and in the attempts to expand the struggle and achieve the world revolution that inspired revolutionaries worldwide, yet never materialized. The Russian leader indelibly marked the 20th century, shaping the course of the entire period. His impact is greater than that of any other historical figure of those years; his shadow and influence still resonate in the 21st century.
Like every historical figure, he has his strengths and weaknesses. In fact, considering the positions held by the few who still defend the author, the latter—what I consider to be his mistakes—become the most important part of the development of this work, since it is where the debate should focus in order to make a defense, as already mentioned, far removed from passionate elements that will only be a source of more distortion and may even create more rejection in opposition.
Lenin was also a man of his time; many things have changed since then, and he cannot be judged one way or another without taking this into account, as this leads to anachronisms that only result in misunderstanding or a blurring of what he advocated.
This study aims to do just the opposite: to critically assess, within the context of his era, a figure who has undoubtedly made his mark on history.
REFERENCES
[1] Eric Hobsbawm, Historia del siglo XX. Barcelona: Crítica, 2005, pp. 89-90.
[2] Roberto Vaquero Arribas, «La Internacional Comunista», Historia de las Ideas, n.º 2, 2025, p. 7.
[3] Christoph Hasselbach, «Stephen Bannon: el lado oscuro del poder», DW, 16 de agosto de 2017.
[4] V Congreso de la Internacional Comunista. 17 de junio – 8 de julio de 1924. Informes. Primera parte. Córdoba: Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente, 1975, pp. 45-46.
[5] Vladimir I. Lenin, «La alianza de los obreros y de los campesinos trabajadores y explotados», en Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo XXVIII. Madrid: Akal, 1976, pp. 533-535.
[6] José Stalin, Los fundamentos del leninismo. Pekín: Lenguas Extranjeras, 1972, pp. 57-72.
[7] León Trotski, Historia de la Revolución rusa. Madrid: Capitán Swing, 2017, p. 1073.
[8] Vladimir I. Lenin, ¿Qué hacer? Moscú: Progreso, s/f, pp. 110-113.
[9] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Carta a un camarada sobre nuestras tareas de organización», en Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo VI. Madrid: Akal, 1976, pp. 251-273.
[10] «Estatutos de la Internacional Comunista», en Los cuatro primeros congresos de la Internacional Comunista. Primera parte, dirigido por José Aricó. Córdoba: Cuadernos de Pasado y Presente, 1973, pp. 103-108.
[11] Vladimir I. Lenin, El Estado y la revolución. Madrid: Alianza, 2006, pp. 40-43.
[12] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Las elecciones a la Asamblea Constituyente y la dictadura del proletariado», en V. I. Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo XL. Moscú: Progreso, 1986, p. 13.
[13] Vladimir I. Lenin, El Estado y la revolución. Madrid: Alianza, 2006, pp. 50-51.
[14] Vladimir I. Lenin, El Estado y la revolución. Madrid: Alianza, 2006, p. 75.
[15] Friedrich Engels, «Revolución y contrarrevolución en Alemania», en C. Marx y F. Engels, Obras escogidas. Tomo I. Moscú: Progreso, 1980, pp. 198-199.
[16] Vladimir I. Lenin, «El marxismo y la insurrección», en V. I. Lenin, El marxismo y la insurrección. Buenos Aires: Anteo, 1973, pp. 13-14.
[17] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Consejos de un espectador», Pravda, n.º 250, 1920.
[18] Walter Ulbricht et al., La Internacional Comunista. Moscú: Progreso, s/f, p. 12.
[19] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Tesis de abril», en Lenin, Obras escogidas. Tomo VI. Moscú: Progreso, 1976, pp. 252-255.
[20] Vladimir I. Lenin, «La actitud de la socialdemocracia ante el problema campesino», en V. I. Lenin, Obras, Tomo III (1905-1912). Moscú: Progreso, 1973, p. 67.
[21] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Dos tácticas de la socialdemocracia en la revolución democrática», en V. I. Lenin, Obras, Tomo III (1905-1912). Moscú: Progreso, 1973, pp. 53-54.
[22] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Dos tácticas de la socialdemocracia en la revolución democrática», en V. I. Lenin, Obras, Tomo III (1905-1912). Moscú: Progreso, 1973, pp. 20-21.
[23] Vladimir I. Lenin, «La caída de Port-Arthur», en V. I. Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo IX. Moscú: Progreso, 1982, pp. 154-155.
[24] Vladimir I. Lenin, «¡La patria socialista está en peligro!», en Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo XXVIII. Madrid: Akal, 1976, pp. 229-230.
[25] En realidad no es un sinónimo, pero es como la gente a día de hoy lo entiende.
[26] Jorge Dimitrov, La ofensiva del fascismo y las tareas de la Internacional Comunista en la lucha por la unidad de la clase obrera contra el fascismo. Madrid: Emiliano Escolar, 1977, pp. 26-78.
[27] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Balance de la discusión sobre la autodeterminación», en Lenin, Obras escogidas en doce tomos. Tomo VI. Moscú: Progreso, 1976, p. 44.
[28] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Carta a los obreros y campesinos de Ucrania a propósito de las victorias de Denikin», en V. I. Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo XL. Moscú: Progreso, 1986, p. 44.
[29] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Notas críticas sobre la cuestión nacional», en Lenin, Obras escogidas en doce tomos. Tomo V. Moscú: Progreso, 1976, p. 28.
[30] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Notas críticas sobre la cuestión nacional», en Lenin, Obras escogidas en doce tomos. Tomo V. Moscú: Progreso, 1976, p. 28.
[31] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Séptima Conferencia (Conferencia de Abril) de toda Rusia del POSD(b)R», en V. I. Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo XXXI. Moscú: Progreso, 1985, p. 375.
[32] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Notas críticas sobre la cuestión nacional», en Lenin, Obras escogidas en doce tomos. Tomo V. Moscú: Progreso, 1976, pp. 39-40.
[33] Vladimir I. Lenin, «La situación y las tareas de la Internacional Socialista», en V. I. Lenin, Sobre el internacionalismo proletario. Moscú: Progreso, 1978, pp. 32-38.
[34] Creación de la guardia fronteriza soviética (1917-1924). Nizhny Novgorod. Organización Pública Regional de Veteranos del Servicio Fronterizo «Guardia Fronteriza de Nizhny Novgorod», s/f.
[35] Vladimir I. Lenin, «El capitalismo y la inmigración de los obreros», en V. I. Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo XXIV. Moscú: Progreso, 1984, p. 99.
[36] Vladimir I. Lenin, «El Congreso Socialista Internacional de Stuttgart», en V. I. Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo XVI. Moscú: Progreso, 1983, p. 76.
[37] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Al secretario de la Liga para la Propaganda Socialista», en V. I. Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo XXVII. Moscú: Progreso, 1985, p. 77.
[38] Aunque Lenin hable de migración moderna, esta era mucho menos masiva que la que sufrimos a día de hoy en Europa.
[39] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Notas críticas sobre la cuestión nacional», en Lenin, Obras escogidas en doce tomos. Tomo V. Moscú: Progreso, 1976, pp. 34-35.
[40] Roberto Vaquero Arribas, «Aculturación y proceso de declive o de desaparición cultural autóctona», Historia de las Ideas, n.º 1, 2024, pp. 34-40.
[41] Vladimir I. Lenin, «Últimos artículos y cartas», en V. I. Lenin, Obras. Tomo XII (1921-1923). Moscú: Progreso, 1973, pp. 151-155.
[42] Vladimir I. Lenin, «A la PDE», en V. I. Lenin, Obras completas. Tomo LIV. Moscú: Progreso, 1988, p. 350.
[43] Denís Paredes Roibás, «Los prefacios del Manifiesto Comunista: un ejemplo de marxismo creativo», Historia de las Ideas, n.º 3, 2025, pp. 2-3.
[44] Vladimir I. Lenin, «El derecho de las naciones a la autodeterminación», en Lenin, Obras escogidas en doce tomos. Tomo V. Moscú: Progreso, 1976, pp. 99-137.