Publicado originalmente en Historia De Las Ideas nº 2 en febrero de 2025

Abstract

The study of the history of the Communist International has been marked in historiography by an ideological bias that obscures the truth about its development. This article focuses on analyzing three fundamental issues: the weight acquired by the national question, from the perspective of shifting positions regarding it; the corrections and disputes over the conception of internationalism and patriotism; and the interventionist and domineering nature of the international organization itself. This work aims, through the common thread between CEIC congresses and plenary sessions, to reflect on the true role of the Communist International in the world revolution, which, in the end, was more national than one might think.

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INTRODUCTION

Any study of communism must be undertaken with caution, since, unfortunately, an anti-communist paradigm exists. This paradigm lends credence to anything that supports the official narrative criminalizing any issue related to revolutionary socialism or communism, while questioning and accusing as revisionists—in the worst sense of the term—those historians who choose to act and investigate without adhering to preconceived notions acceptable to the prevailing political and ideological narrative.

The pursuit of knowledge, the clarification of facts, however controversial they may be, is a task that we historians must carry out.

Regarding the history of the Soviet Union and the Communist International, these impositions prevent, or at least hinder, the analysis of the errors, corrections, and developments of these historical processes and experiences. It is difficult to determine the political errors in a process when, for many researchers, everything was a tremendous crime and nothing was done right.

The main problem in analyzing these kinds of issues, besides the reliability of the sources and even the falsification of some, is the polarization that exists regarding everything related to communism; it is difficult to find historians who are not swayed by their basest, most passionate instincts.

This article will briefly outline the history of the Communist International, focusing the analysis on vital issues such as the national reality from the perspective of changes in position with respect to it; the rectifications and struggles over the conception of internationalism and patriotism and the interventionist and dominant character of the international organization itself, with special attention to the role of the so-called international delegates.

These three issues, along with other less significant ones that will also be analyzed, led to the dissolution of the Comintern. This work aims, through the thread connecting congresses and plenary sessions of the CEIC (Conference of International Communists), to reflect on the true role of the Communist International in the world revolution, which, in the end, was more national than one might think.

Following the failure of Trotsky's permanent revolution (and Lenin's internationalist vision) and the success and enduring nature of Stalin's socialism-in-one-country policy, this analysis must also include the successes and failures of all revolutionary experiences after the October Revolution.

We can only ask ourselves one rhetorical question: what revolution does not have a national character?

This paper will demonstrate the importance of the national fact and how it conditioned Stalin to make great changes that went far beyond rhetoric, forcing the Soviets to adapt to material conditions that ended up prevailing over the revolutionary romanticism of the emerging phase of the Soviet Revolution.

HISTORY OF THE COMMUNIST INTERNATIONAL

It was founded under the auspices of Lenin himself and the Bolsheviks within the framework of needs they established in accordance with the international problems of the class struggle and the world revolution.

The Bolsheviks did not see this global revolution as a mere slogan; they firmly believed it was necessary and historically inevitable. They considered themselves the successors of the Communist League and the First and Second Internationals.

Its primary mission was the unity and cohesion of communist parties against the bourgeoisie. It was based on the premise that capital was an international entity and that, therefore, workers should organize themselves accordingly.

Lenin outlined the ideological foundations for the formation of the new International, taking into account the success of the Russian experiment and based on the study of imperialism as a new phase of capitalism and the need to adapt to it.

It is obvious that the strength the Bolsheviks gained after the October Revolution enabled them to lead this entire process. The Bolshevik leader established the foundations of the International's structure and organic functioning, emphasizing internationalism, mutual aid among revolutionaries, the unity of the working masses, democratic centralism, and party discipline.

Regarding internationalism and international revolution, it is important to note that even Soviet texts acknowledged a shift in perspective according to material conditions, advocating for socialism in one country under Stalin and accepting the reality of national identity. [1].

Over the years they would end up embracing revolutionary patriotism and renouncing any anti-national nihilistic vision, forming a patriotic communism that had little to do with the cosmopolitan internationalism supported by Lenin in the past, which had its peak in the struggle and victory against Hitler in World War II. [2].

Even before this event, after the sad experience of Brest-Litovsk and the collapse of the plans for world revolution, they went from not even referring to Russia in their documents to establishing the most impermeable border body in the world and claiming the homeland as their own.

A good example of this whole process of change is this publication from the Central Committee of the CPSU, signed by Chernov in 1950:

"National nihilism is a manifestation of the anti-patriotic ideology of cosmopolitan bourgeois, showing a lack of respect for national pride and the national dignity of the people. Comrade Stalin said: “National nihilism only harms socialism, acting as a tool of the nationalist bourgeois.” Comrade Stalin spoke forcefully against those who suggested that “the struggle against nationalism must, at the same time, eliminate everything national.” National nihilism, under our conditions, is a form of struggle chosen by rootless cosmopolitans against Soviet patriotism, against Soviet culture (the form is national, the content is socialist); it is a display of their disgusting worship of bourgeois culture. In this way, national nihilism and its attitude towards the Great Russian people and the rest of the peoples of our nation have been repeatedly linked by uprooted cosmopolitans with the nationalist bourgeoisie, which today is inseparably tied to this cosmopolitan ideology of the imperialist bourgeoisie." [3].

Como consecuencia de la Gran Guerra se formaron tres grupos dentro del movimiento socialista: el socialchovinista, el centrista y el internacionalista.

As a consequence of the Great War, three groups formed within the socialist movement: the social-chauvinist, the centrist, and the internationalist. The first of these groups advocated defending their homeland in the international conflict, voting in favor of war credits and thus participating in the war; the second opposed the war but sought unity with the former; and the third waged a struggle against the country's own bourgeoisie in opposition to the international armed conflict [4].

In the context of the fragmentation of the workers' movement, a political conference was convened in Zimmerwald, Switzerland, from September 5 to 8, 1915. Within this conference, a left-wing group, the Zimmerwald Left, was formed, which included the Bolsheviks. They were a minority within the overall group at the conference, but their presence enabled Lenin to influence workers' groups other than the Russian one.

Their aim was to lead the revolutionary forces against the capitalist governments, thus ending the war and establishing socialism. [5].

Right-wing positions prevailed and imposed a social-pacifism that displeased the left-wing group, who considered this stance a betrayal. From then on, Lenin committed to creating a new international.

Initially, he encountered resistance even within his own party, ultimately losing on this issue at the RSDLP's April conference, and was forced to remain in Zimmerwald and participate in the third conference. [6].

The conference, promoted by the Italian socialists, was born as an attempt at worker organization against the war, whose main demand was to achieve an armistice without annexations or war reparations. [7].

Following the Bolsheviks' success, a meeting was held in Petrograd in January 1918 to found the new international, attended by delegates from numerous countries. The meeting's objective was to unite forces based on two fundamental issues for the Bolsheviks: revolutionary struggle within their own countries to achieve peace, and support for the Russian Soviet regime. [8].

In January 1919, Lenin held another meeting in Moscow, where a call for a founding congress of the new international was approved. Thirty-nine workers' organizations and groups participated in this meeting, highlighting the influence of the new Soviet power over them.

No prominent leaders of European workers' parties attended this conference, with the exception of the German Albert Eberlin, leader of the Spartacists. [9].

The Comintern had a distinctly Russian character, a situation exacerbated by the war. The German participant opposed the formation of the Communist International. He was the only one to do so; there was a fear of a permanent split within the workers' movement. [10].

The International Communist Conference began on March 2nd at the Kremlin. Fifty-two delegates representing 35 organizations from 21 countries attended. Only 19 delegates had voting rights; the rest could only speak.

Only the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was a large and powerful party; the others were comparatively small groups. At this conference, the basic programmatic lines of the communist movement were approved, clearly defining its position on bourgeois democracy and its firm commitment to the dictatorship of the proletariat.

On March 4th, the question of forming the Third International was raised, and it was supported by all except the representative of the Communist Party of Germany, who abstained. That same day, the Zimmerwald Union was dissolved.

The conference thus became the First Congress, agreeing to create an Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), which would become the leading body of the International between congresses. They also approved the creation of a five-person bureau and subsequently elected Zinoviev as its president. [11].

The CEIC promoted the creation of The Communist International, the political and theoretical organ of the Comintern, which was published in Russian, English, French, Chinese, and Spanish. It was conceived as a useful tool for developing the ideological struggle and strengthening the communist parties that were members of the International.

That same year, the CEIC promoted a general strike in Europe in support of the Russian Revolution, which was under siege by several capitalist countries. The strike was not more successful due to the actions of the reformists, who remained at odds with the Bolsheviks. [12].

That same year, the CEIC promoted a general strike in Europe in support of the Russian Revolution, which was under siege by several capitalist countries. The strike was not more successful due to the actions of the reformists, who remained at odds with the Bolsheviks.The CEICs were highly influential in decision-making; some were comparable in importance to the congresses themselves. [13].

The Second Congress of the Comintern opened in Petrograd on July 19, 1920; however, it moved to Moscow on July 23 and concluded there on August 7.

Two hundred and seventeen delegates representing 67 organizations from 37 different countries participated. In addition to the communist parties, trade unions and non-voting delegates from the Independent Social Democratic Party of Germany and the French Socialist Party were also present.

The entire Congress unfolded within a climate of heightened emotion stemming from the rejection of the Polish offensive on Soviet soil. The Congress also focused on the Bolshevization of the peoples of the East. [14]. El Congreso se centró también en la bolchevización de los pueblos de Oriente [15].

The main issue discussed at the Congress was the creation of communist parties in each country and the strengthening of existing ones. Communist forces were fragmented and weakened, and it was necessary to force unification into a single organization.

Emphasis was also placed on the organizational model and the implementation of democratic centralism. [16].

During the Congress, the 21 conditions for joining the Comintern were approved. These outlined the ideological and organizational principles, detailing what made a communist party a new kind of party. [17].

These conditions, specifically clauses 15 and 16, imposed strict control by the central body over the regional parties. This is particularly evident in the following two passages:

"It is mandatory that the programs of the parties affiliated with the Communist International be confirmed by the World Congress and by the Executive Committee." [18].

In other words, no party could have a political program that adapted to the material conditions of the struggle at the time. They always had to consult on what they wanted to do, delaying decisions, missing tactical opportunities, and having to obey orders that went against their own interests, since the USSR often had a significant lack of understanding of the country's reality.

It's one thing to have a common line, and quite another to maintain a flawed tactic due to mechanical impositions.

This was clearly seen in the example of Spain, where, ill-advised by incompetent delegates, the PCE acted in a leftist manner, going from five thousand members to less than eight hundred after the proclamation of the Republic, of whom only half would pay the dues. [19].

They defended leftist positions during the proclamation of the Republic, which led to their marginalization. When Bullejos supported the republican regime during the Sanjurjo coup attempt, they expelled him in a rather opaque manner, ultimately forcing José Díaz, after the Seventh Congress of the International, to abandon the "class against class" slogan and support the republic—the very reason Bullejos and his group had been expelled.

"All decisions of the Congresses of the Communist International, as well as those of the Executive Committee, are binding on all parties affiliated with the Communist International." [20].

As if the aforementioned control of the programs, including of course the tactical objectives and the procedures for achieving them, were not enough, they decided to add another condition: that the guidelines and orders be adopted without question.

This control intensified when the international tutors/delegates, wielding considerable power, visited the respective parties in the countries that were part of the international organization.

There was always a strong democratic deficit in the organic and political functioning of the International, since its positions were closely linked to the interests and even the experience of the Soviet Government [21].

These types of anomalies were never resolved, since even the dissolution of the Comintern was done without a congress in which everyone could participate. [22].

Although this was a result of the balance of power and the leadership of the USSR within the communist movement, it does not exempt them from the fact that, once a certain level of development of the international organization had been reached, they themselves would have tried to remedy it, a matter which they never even considered undertaking at any time.

The Comintern became an international party, made up of sections from each of the member countries. The CEIC (Executive Committee of the Comintern) directed the organization between congresses, which were theoretically to be held annually, although they ended up being held less frequently.

Shortly after the closing of this Second Congress, the First Congress of the Peoples of the East met in Baku, with the attendance of almost 2,000 delegates. [23].

The Comintern, in turn, had a series of auxiliary organizations that supported and extended its influence in certain areas. The most prominent of these were the Profintern or Red International of Trade Unions, the International Red Aid, the International Workers' Aid, the Krestintern or Peasant International, the Sportintern or Red International of Sport, the International Cooperative Movement, the International Women's Secretariat, and the International Communist Youth. [24].

To these should be added the International of Freethinkers and the Godless, the International Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries, the Miners' International, the International of Merchant Seamen and Dockers, the International Committee Against War and Fascism, the International of Revolutionary Writers and Artists, and the International of Teachers' Union. [25].

The Third Congress of the Communist International began on June 22, 1921. It was attended by 605 delegates from 103 organizations. The debates focused on analyzing the problems of the international situation and the strategy to be implemented by the communists.

Trade union issues, youth movements, and the women's question were also addressed. The conquest of the masses, of the majority of the working class, was the subject of criticism, especially in confrontation with more leftist positions. [26].

In addition, they focused on the analysis of the global economic crisis and the economic policy of Soviet Russia. [27].

The Congress rejected the so-called offensive theory, pointing to adventurism as a dangerous problem that could paralyze revolutionary activity.

Leftist leanings could be seen in the actions against participation in electoral processes and in the work of certain communist groups within trade unions, who viewed these activities as reformist. [28].

During the Third Congress of the Comintern, the construction of a united proletarian front was advocated. To achieve this goal, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie, and intellectuals had to be won over, coordinating them all in the struggle against the offensive of capital.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was also defined, aiming to develop the country economically and thus continue building towards socialism, establishing the economic base for its implementation. They intended to achieve this through industrial development, combined with a reorganization of agriculture. The NEP was intended to be a transitional policy. [29].

They established new organizational principles, distinct from the structure of social democratic parties. Communist parties were restructured by territory and workplace, creating cells in factories and organizing militants into mass fronts. Democratic centralism was implemented as the organizational system.

In September 1921, the CEIC bureau changed its name to the Presidium. The proposal for a united workers' front was analyzed by the First Plenum of the CEIC, held in early 1922. [30].

Shortly afterward, from April 2nd to 5th, a conference was held in Berlin with leading members of the Communist International, the Second and Second and a Half Internationals, with the aim of organizing a world congress of all workers' organizations. Disputes, contradictions, and conflicting objectives prevented these efforts from succeeding. [31].

The Fourth Congress of the Comintern began on November 5th. It was attended by 408 delegates from 58 communist parties. Zinoviev defended theses that would later be labelled as leftist.

He argued that capitalism was in a period of weakness and that fascism would consolidate its power in Central Europe, thus opening up significant revolutionary opportunities. His theses were rejected by the delegates as a whole.

During the Congress, emphasis was placed on the importance of communists confronting fascist shock troops, advocating for a united front and the use of illegal methods.

The Comintern championed workers' governments, in opposition to the coalition with the bourgeoisie maintained by the reformists; the objective of the united front was to end bourgeois rule. [32].

The Comintern aimed to win over the masses to reformism, who had to act under communist command or be labeled as saboteurs of unity by them. [33].

Fascism was not given due importance; the March on Rome had occurred only a few weeks before the Congress, and it was decided that it would be discussed in more depth at the CEIC meeting in June 1923. [34].

Another important issue that the Congress focused on was the question of the national liberation movement of colonial countries, the anti-imperialist struggle and the alliance of workers at the international level, calling for the creation of a united anti-imperialist front. [35].

The Fourth Congress reaffirmed the great growth that the IC had achieved worldwide, establishing itself on every continent and in virtually every country. [36].

The Third Enlarged Plenum of the CEIC, held from June 12 to 23, 1923, in Moscow, Russia, was attended by 26 communist parties. A key focus was the analysis of the rise of fascism, particularly the report on the Clara Zetkin Question.

The united front remained the preferred strategy, and the Bulgarian Communist Party was heavily criticized for its stance regarding the coup d'état that had taken place in Bulgaria on June 9. [37].

The Fifth Congress of the Comintern was held in Moscow, Russia, beginning on June 17, 1924. It was the first congress in which Lenin did not participate in any way. A total of 504 delegates representing 49 communist parties and workers' organizations attended.

The consolidation of communist parties and halting the offensive of capital were two of the main issues addressed during the Congress. [38].

It is necessary to take into account that in the time between the 4th and 5th Congresses, the German workers' movement had failed in 1923. [39].

The Congress outlined the characteristics a communist party should possess: mass appeal, flexible tactics free from dogmatism, revolutionary spirit, centralization, and discipline. It emphasized the need for the Bolshevization of the parties belonging to the International, including the elimination of factions within those parties. [40].

This Bolshevization involved a process of increasing the requirements to be eligible to become a member of the communist party. [41].

During the Congress, the agrarian question and the national question were not addressed, as they were not convenient for the leadership, given that they did not fit with the shift to the left that they were making. [42].

At this Congress, a triumvirate was established between Zinoviev, Bukharin and Stalin, it was decided that the congresses would continue to be held every two years and that the chairman of the CEIC and the Presidium would become the chairman of the Comintern, a distinction that did not previously exist. [43].

Historically, there has been a general tendency to separate the Lenin and Stalin periods as if a radical, qualitative change had occurred in the functioning of the Comintern, especially regarding authoritarianism and internal democracy.

In light of newly emerging documents, these positions are being called into question. The Comintern was always interventionist in the affairs of the national sections, both under Lenin and Stalin; they always used the Comintern as an instrument in the service of Russian revolutionary interests.

Stalin continued what Lenin had begun, with great intelligence and shrewdness, adapting to the difficult circumstances they faced.

Some extended plenary sessions of the CEIC were of great importance. It was at the Fifth Plenum that the disputes with the Trotskyists began to escalate, reflecting a problem that had emerged with greater virulence within the USSR.

This plenary session endorsed the line of Bolshevization, stabilization, and the united front tactic. [44]This last issue was again important at the Sixth Enlarged Plenum, which called for communist parties to collaborate with social democrats.

One of its tasks was to prepare for the Sixth Congress of the Comintern, and it also identified extreme left-wing positions as the most dangerous enemy, rather than right-wing ones. Bordiga assumed the role of opposition at that plenum. [45].

The Seventh Plenum, held in an expanded format, again emphasized the struggle against Trotskyism and removed Zinoviev from his leadership role in the Comintern.

The Eighth Plenum focused on opposition to the war and the revolutionary question in China.

The Ninth Plenum reaffirmed the line imposed shortly before, "class against class," hindering the formation of an effective united front and constituting a grave error. [46].

The "class against class" policy framed the united front as a grassroots united front, excluding social democratic and non-communist leaders in general for being traitors to the working class and serving the bourgeoisie. In fact, they came to be called social fascists. [47].

This tactic was especially disastrous in Spain; the communists were unable to make any progress until the International itself rectified its course after the Seventh Congress. They failed to achieve hegemony within the workers' movement, nor did they manage to win over socialist militants and those of other political leanings who identified with their organizations and leaders, and who did not understand the communists' sectarianism, especially given the advance of reaction across Europe.

The Sixth Congress of the Comintern was held from July 17 to September 1, 1928. It was attended by 532 delegates from 66 communist parties and revolutionary organizations.

During the Congress, it was noted that the general tendency of reactionaries was to instigate a war against the USSR, and therefore the main task of the revolutionary movement was to defend the Russian experience.

The struggle should not be focused solely on bourgeois forces, but should also include a confrontation with social democracy, which they even went so far as to link to fascism.

It was at this Congress that the Comintern program was debated and adopted. They placed great emphasis on the question of imperialist wars and the measures to combat them. [48].

Between the 5th and 6th Congresses many changes occurred, some of them affecting the youth section, which already had its own program and which came to be considered outdated, being forced to conform to the program of the Communist International. [49].

By obligated I mean literally obligated, as already stated, the program of each section had to be approved by the International; the youth, obviously, was not going to be an exception.

The tenth enlarged Plenum of the European Communist Party (ECP) focused its activity on combating and condemning right-wing opportunism, for exaggerating the benefits of capitalism in the current situation, for relaxing discipline, and for underestimating the danger of war. Bukharin was removed from the leadership of the Comintern.

The eleventh Plenum focused on analyzing the rise of fascism in Europe, noting that social democracy was "a continuous process of evolution towards fascism."

The twelfth Plenum of the ECP continued with the question of fascism and imperialist war. During this session, they overestimated the capacity of the revolutionary movement, which in reality was being overtaken by fascism. [50].

The Seventh Congress of the Comintern was held on June 25, 1935, in Moscow, at the House of Trade Unions. 513 delegates participated, representing 65 communist parties and workers' organizations.

A shift in direction occurred with regard to fascism, both in its definition and characterization, and in the measures and strategies to be pursued. The Popular Front policy was adopted, which consisted of broadening alliances to include groups that did not support the dictatorship of the proletariat but were interested in defending democratic freedoms against fascism.

The Congress also analyzed the need for the struggle for peace, given the imminent danger of a new world conflagration. Fearing a possible attack on the USSR, peace took on particular importance because their survival was at stake; moreover, for them, peace was a guarantee of future socialist achievements. [51].

This course correction, this Popular Front tactic, led to left-wing victories in the elections in both France and Spain. In the Spanish case, the numerical growth and increased capabilities of the party were particularly noteworthy.

With the outbreak of World War II, the Allies pressured Stalin to dissolve the International, but this cannot be the sole reason for its dissolution. They made many demands, and he only yielded on those that were politically advantageous to him.

Undoubtedly, there was another, more significant reason: the communist parties had grown, and their leadership was going to prevent the previously exercised control from remaining, at least, with the same intensity.

Stalin understood that many mistakes had been made and that the revolutionary struggle was eminently national in nature. The series of previous failures clearly demonstrated this. Therefore, the USSR decided to approach relations with the parties differently; the unified command center was unworkable.

La Internacional se estrelló contra el hecho nacional [52] The International collided with the reality of nationalism and it was dissolved without holding a congress, clearly showing the lack of internal democracy that had existed throughout its existence. [53].

IN CONCLUSION

From the outset, the Communist International was marked by the Bolsheviks' stance against the war, their confrontation with the reformists, and their vision of proletarian internationalism and the national question. Of course, it was also subordinate to the victorious Russian experience, that is, to the new Soviet government.

One of the biggest problems of the Comintern, besides the lack of internal democracy, was the mechanical extrapolation of political tactics and positions that had been successful in Russia to other countries without taking into account the material conditions of each country.

Furthermore, information was often slow to reach Russia, and even after a decision was made, it was slow to return to the country of origin. This often led to untimely and erroneous actions, causing significant harm to the Communist Party, which awaited the dictates of the International.

This delay in information dissemination granted considerable power to the delegate/tutor, who inflicted so much damage on the PCE in Spain, and who was, in reality, the one in charge of the party.

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REFERENCES

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[3] Fiódor Vasilievich Chernov, «El cosmopolitismo burgués y su papel reaccionario», El Bolchevique: Revista teórica y política del Comité Central del PC(B), n.º 5, 15 de marzo de 1949, pp. 20-41.

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[37] Walter Ulbricht et al., La Internacional Comunista. Moscú: Progreso, s/f, pp. 78-80.

[38] Walter Ulbricht et al., La Internacional Comunista. Moscú: Progreso, s/f, pp. 90-91.

[39] Edward H. Carr, El socialismo en un solo país, 1924-1926. Vol. 3, segunda parte. Madrid: Alianza, 1976, p. 83.

[40] Walter Ulbricht et al., La Internacional Comunista. Moscú: Progreso, s/f, p. 93.

[41] Annie Kriegel, Las internacionales obreras (1864-1943). Barcelona: Orbis, 1986, pp. 99-100.

[42] Edward H. Carr, El socialismo en un solo país, 1924-1926. Vol. 3, segunda parte. Madrid: Alianza, 1976, p. 90.

[43] Edward H. Carr, El socialismo en un solo país, 1924-1926. Vol. 3, segunda parte. Madrid: Alianza, 1976, pp. 897-898.

[44] Edward H. Carr, El socialismo en un solo país, 1924-1926. Vol. 3, segunda parte. Madrid: Alianza, 1976, pp. 293-302.

[45] Edward H. Carr, El socialismo en un solo país, 1924-1926. Vol. 3, segunda parte. Madrid: Alianza, 1976, pp. 498-508.

[46] Walter Ulbricht et al., La Internacional Comunista. Moscú: Progreso, s/f, pp. 99-117.

[47] Annie Kriegel, Las internacionales obreras (1864-1943). Barcelona: Orbis, 1986, pp. 108-109.

[48] Walter Ulbricht et al., La Internacional Comunista. Moscú: Progreso, s/f, pp. 117-122.

[49] Edward H. Carr, El socialismo en un solo país, 1924-1926. Vol. 3, segunda parte. Madrid: Alianza, 1976, pp. 1007-1008.

[50] Walter Ulbricht et al., La Internacional Comunista. Moscú: Progreso, s/f, pp. 125-141.

[51] Walter Ulbricht et al., La Internacional Comunista. Moscú: Progreso, s/f, pp. 160-170.

[52] Fernando Claudín, La crisis del movimiento comunista. Vol. 1: De la Komintern al Kominform. Colombes: Ruedo Ibérico, 1978, p. 39.

[53] Daniela Spenser, «La historia de la Internacional Comunista a la luz de los nuevos enfoques y documentos», Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Políticas y Sociales, vol. 44, n.º 181, 2001, p. 156.